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Our justice system articulates reliance upon the best interests of the
child standard when dealing with the child. This simple standard im-
plies that the child is the focus of any decision making process which
impacts upon the placement or welfare of the child. In application, how-
ever, courts appear to experience great difficulty with the application of
the test, particularly because they must consider the competing interests
of parents in custody and access conflicts, and the interest of the state,
or its agencies, in child welfare matters. The focus of this Article is cus-
tody and access. Notwithstanding difficulties applying the best interest
test, we are of the view that the test should remain the primary analytical
tool used by courts in the determination of child custody and access
cases. However, to ensure that the best interests of the child are met,
independent representation for children should be made mandatory in
all child custody cases.
Interest in the subject matter evolved as a result of an invitation to
participate in the American Bar Association conference titled "Family
Law and the 'Best Interest of the Child,'" held at Ripon College, Ripon,
Wisconsin, April 11-14, 1991. The multi-discipline symposium focused
on the issue of best serving the interests of the child. It became appar-
ent during the four day conference that our institutions that were
designed to serve the needs of the child often ignore that voice and fail
to represent the child's best interests. This Article explores the history
of the best interest test and its application within the justice system by
first considering custody and access from a Canadian perspective,
through Canadian statutes and jurisprudence and their respective appli-
cation in Canadian courts, and second, considering similar develop-
ments in England and other common law jurisdictions, specifically
making comparisons with the United States. The Article concludes with
a discussion of the role of counsel for the child in custody disputes.
Upon examination of the inherent difficulties in applying the stan-
dard and the available alternatives, our conclusion is that in order to
ensure that the best interests of the child are met, mandatory independ-
ent representation of the child is an essential safeguard and worthy of
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the resources necessary to implement such a program. Without in-
dependent representation, it is impossible to guarantee that the best in-
terest test will be applied in such a manner as to protect the child's best
interests.
I. THE BEST INTEREST TEST
A. Early History
The best interest test is relatively new to the common-law system.
Until the last century in our society, the common-law regarded children
as an economic asset which denied them legal identity and treated them
as objects. Fathers had the prerogatives of ownership until children
reached twenty-one years of age,' and only "extraordinary unfitness
would deprive the father of his custodial right."12 Through the vague
doctrine of parens patriae, however, the Chancery Court did occasion-
ally intervene to ameliorate a paternalistic common-law system.3 The
phrase "parens patriae" is used to describe the power of the court to act
in loco parentis to protect the personal or the property interest of a
child.
4
Under this "wardship" jurisdiction, the Court of Chancery as-
sumed guardianship of the child. This power developed ...
from about the time of the Restoration of the Monarchy in
1660, when the Ancient Court of Wards was abolished.., and
for three centuries was used almost exclusively to protect the
property and persons of infants. The power was not created by
any statute and could not therefore . . .be affected, restricted
or curtailed by any legislation unless that legislation [was]
clearly directed to that power or purpose.
5
In the old English case of Shelley v. Westbrooke,6 the court exercised
its parens patriae jurisdiction after considering whether a father was fit
to exclusively make decisions on behalf of his children. The court
stated:
I consider this, therefore, as a case in which the father has
demonstrated that he must, and does deem it to be [a] matter
of duty which his principles impose upon him, to recommend
to those whose opinions and habits he may take upon himself
to form, that conduct in some of the most important relations
of life, as moral and virtuous, which the law calls upon me to
consider as immoral and vicious - conduct which the law
animadverts upon as inconsistent with the duties of persons in
such relations of life, and which it considers as injuriously af-
1. Tenures Abolition Act , 1660, 12 Car. II, ch. 24, (Eng.).
2. Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interests of the Child: By Whose Definition? 18 PEPP. L. REV.
383, 384 (1991) (citing Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850, 851 (1821)).
3. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
4. Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REV., 167, 173.
5. OLIVE M. STONE, THE CHILD'S VOICE IN THE COURT OF LAw 123-24 (1982).
6. 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1817).
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fecting both the interests of such persons and those of the
community.
I cannot, therefore, think that I should be justified in delivering
over these children for their education exclusively, to what is
called the care to which Mr. S. wishes it to be intrusted.
7
Not until the 1839 enactment of the Custody of Infants Act 8 could a
mother apply to the Court of Chancery, which "might, in its discretion,
give her custody of her younger children . . . and access or visitation
rights to all her minor children." 9
The past century saw the demise of the common-law notion that the
father should always have custody, and the emergence of the best inter-
est test. In the United States, these opinions were first expressed by
Justice Brewer,' 0 and later by Justice Cardozo. I I Assuming a mother
was morally fit, this new standard resulted in an almost automatic pref-
erence for the mother with no meaningful inquiry into what would be in
the best interest of the child.12 What emerged was a shift in the proprie-
tary interest in children from the father to the mother.' 3 However, at
the turn of the century in most common-law jurisdictions, legislation en-
trenched the rights of children expressed in the best interest test,
though it was not until the last half of this century that the status of the
child gained attention and courts gave children individual identity and
attention as an independent person.
B. Current Applications
Legislation in most jurisdictions has entrenched the application of
the best interest test. In Canada, the statutory basis for the test is found
in the federal Divorce Act of 1985.14 The Divorce Act has universal ap-
plication in all of Canada when parties are dissolving a marriage and
continues to apply to the status of children after the divorce judgment
where custody and access are at issue. As well, each province has its
own applicable legislation. Provincial legislation can be invoked where
there is no divorce proceeding or in conjunction with a divorce action.
In the Province of Ontario, for example, the Children's Law Reform
Act 15 deals with custody and access. While both the federal Divorce Act
and the provincial Children's Law Reform Act differ in some respects,
they both provide guidance and parameters to the adjudication of cus-
tody matters, and require that the issue of custody and access be deter-
7. Id. at 851.
8. Custody of Infants Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 54 (Eng.).
9. Id. (custody was considered for children up to age 7 in 1839, and later extended
to age 16 in 1873).
10. Chapsky v. Wood, 40 Am. Rep. 321 (1881).
1I. Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
12. Robert F. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Famity Law, 2J. FAM. L.
101 (1962).
13. HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN 3-7 (1974).
14. Divorce Act of 1985, S.C., ch. 4 (1986) (Can.).
15. Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. 152 (1980) (Can.).
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mined in accordance with the best interests of the child. 16 Section 24(2)
of the Children's Law Reform Act, however, is more directive and pro-
vides more statutory criteria than the federal Divorce Act which must be
considered by a court in determining what constitutes the best interests
of the child. The Act reads:
In determining the best interests of a child for the purposes of
an application or motion under this Part in respect of custody
of or access to a child, a court shall consider all the child's
needs and circumstances, including
(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child
and,
(i) each person seeking custody or access,
(ii) other members of the child's family residing with
him or her,
(iii) persons involved in the child's care and
upbringing,
(b) the child's views and preferences, if they can be rea-
sonably ascertained;
(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home
environment;
(d) the ability of each person seeking custody or access to
act as a parent;
(e) the ability and willingness of each parent seeking cus-
tody to provide the child with guidance, education and ne-
cessities of life and meet any special needs of the child;
(f) any plans proposed for the child's care and upbringing;
(g) the permanence and stability of the family unit with
which it is proposed that the child will live; and
(h) the relationship, by blood or through an adoption or-
der, between the child and each person who is a party to
the application or motion.
17
Both the federal and provincial statutes, which are meant to achieve
similar purposes, exemplify the differing approaches that the various
provincial legislatures have taken.' 8
An examination of relevant case law leads to the conclusion that
Canadian courts have difficulty in applying the applicable law and its
best interests philosophy. In the Ontario Court of Appeals case of Carter
v. Brooks,' 9 the court considered the best interest test and how it remains
the primary analytical tool used by contemporary courts when determin-
16. Compare Divorce Act at § 16(8) ("In making an order under this section, the
court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as
determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the
child.") with Children's Law Reform Act at § 24(1) ("The merits of an application ... in
respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined on the basis of the best
interests of the child.").
17. Children's Law Reform Act at § 24(2).
18. See R.S.A., ch. D-37, Part 7 (1980) (Can.); R.S.B.C., ch. 121, sec. 24 (1979) (Can.);
R.S.M., ch. 8, sec. 2(1) (1985-86) (Can.); S.N.B., ch. F-22, sec. 129 (1980) (Can.); NFLD.
R.S., ch. 61 (1988) (Can.); R.S.N.S., ch. 160, sec. 18(5) (1989) (Can.); R.S.P.E.I., ch. C-33
(1988) (Can.); R.S.Q., ch. 39, sec. II, arts. 568-70 (1980) (Can.); S.S., ch. c-8.1, pt. II, sec. 8
(1990) (Can.).
19. 30 R.F.L.3d 53 (Ont. C.A. 1990).
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ing custody. The court also discussed some of the difficulties courts face
in their application of the test. The court stated:
What guidance can be given for the application of the best in-
terests of the child test? This area of the law is no different
from many others where, in the application of a broad legal
standard, what is desired is both predictability of result and jus-
tice to the parties based on the particular circumstances of the
case. It is often difficult to ensure by "rules" that both objects
are met. If the rules are too precise, it may be that important
circumstances in some cases will be left out of account in apply-
ing the governing test, and justice will suffer. On the other
hand, if there is [sic] not certain common understandings in
how the issue is to be approached, the danger is one of undue
subjectivity, with the consequence of reduced predictability.
Having regard to the foregoing, I am satisfied that the best in-
terest test cannot be implemented by the devising of a code of
substantive rules, even if this could be done within the confines
of a single case.
2 0
In the British case ofJ v. C,2 1 Lord MacDermott outlined his view of
the statutes to be considered by a court applying the best interests test. He
stated:
Reading these words in their ordinary significance, and relating
them to the various classes of proceedings which the section
has already mentioned, it seems to me that they must mean
more than that the child's welfare is to be treated as the top
item in a list of items relevant to the matter in question. I think
they connote a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, re-
lationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and
other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the
course to be followed is that which is most in the interests of
the child's welfare as that term is now to be understood. That
is the first consideration because it is of the first importance in
the paramount consideration because it rules upon and deter-
mines the course to be followed.
22
It appears that the best interest test is a balancing and weighing of
numerous factors that may impact upon the upbringing of the child.
Consequently, this is an area of law where subjective views and feelings
can and often do, exert subtle influences.
Author Kingsley Davis discussed the difficulty with the application
of the best interest test and wrote that "[t]he welfare of the child rather
than the claims of the parents is supposed to be the goal, but what is
'welfare' to one Judge is apt to differ from what is welfare to another."' 23
Professor Adrian Bradbrook later discussed the Ontario Court's applica-
tion of the best interest test, and compared the similarities between On-
20. Id. at 61.
21. 1 All E.R. 788 (1969).
22. Id. at 820-21.
23. Kingsley Davis, Sociologic and Statistical A-nalysis, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700,
706 (1944).
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tario's application of custody law with the findings of Kingsley Davis'
similar Pennsylvania study twenty-seven years earlier. 2 4 Professor Brad-
brook writes:
There is no area of law over which the Judge has a wider discre-
tion than child custody adjudication.... In view of the dispar-
ity of opinions expressed by the judges in almost every topic
discussed in the study, it would seem that the findings of the
1943 Pennsylvania study, that there are no universally applica-
ble principles in custody disputes, still apply today ... in Penn-
sylvania there was an almost complete lack of crystallized
opinion regarding custody. The judges needed to use rough
and vague rules of thumb in making their decisions and be-
lieved that general principles were inapplicable because of the
different fact-situation in each case. Although the majority of
the judges relied to some extent on the advice of social work
agencies, only twenty-five percent admitted that they were in-
fluenced by changing customs and social values when formulat-
ing their judgments.
2 5
It is submitted that in the twenty years following Professor
Bradbook's article, and despite clearly defined statutory guidelines,
common-law courts continue to grapple with the application of the best
interest test in the determination of child custody and access.
II. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE BEST INTEREST TEST
A. Inherent Difficulties
In presenting the issues that impact the child, a parent's position is
not only opposing, but also subjective. In Ford v. Ford,26 the United
States Supreme Court considered the application of the best interest
test and the inherent problems in relying on bitter and acrimonious par-
ents to adequately represent their children during the custody proceed-
ing. The Court found "experience has shown that the question of
custody, so vital to a child's happiness and well being, frequently cannot
be left to the discretion of parents. This is particularly true where ... the
estrangement of husband and wife beclouds parental judgment with
emotion and prejudice."
'2 7
Canadian authors Philip Epstein and Susanne Goodman find that
the central issue in child custody disputes is determining what type of
evidence must be presented to enable the presiding judge to objectively
ascertain the best interests of the child.2 8 In addressing custody and
access issues, the authors write:
24. Adrian Bradbrook, An Empirical Study of the Attitudes of the Judges of the Supreme Court
of Ontario regarding the IIWorkings of the Present Child Custody Adjudication Laws, 49 CAN. B. REV.
557 (1971).
25. Id. at 571.
26. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
27. Id. at 193. See also Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions:
All that Glitters is not Gault, 15J. FAM. L. 27 (1976-77).
28. Philip Epstein & Susanne Goodman, Custody and Access, in FAMILY LAW REFERENCE
Materials, ch.4, I (Law Society of Upper Canada 1991).
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It is clear from the opening words of § 24(2) [of the Ontario
Legislation] that the enumerated criteria are not to be viewed
as exhaustive. Also evident from this section is that the para-
mount consideration in a custody dispute is the best interests of
the child. Accordingly, the object of the proceeding is to place
the child, rather than the persons applying for custody, at the
crux of the decision. Due to the inherently adversarial nature
of a court proceeding, coupled with the emotional anxiety
which is part and parcel of a custody dispute, the central focus
is often misplaced. As was stated by Mr. Justice Bayda in
Wakaluk v. Wakaluk (1976), 25 R.F.L. 292 (Sask. C.A.), at 292-
293:
The issue of custody is without doubt the most impor-
tant one - and was so treated by counsel at the hear-
ing of this appeal - and the most troublesome. While
at the hearing of the appeal the parties concentrated
their attention on this issue, they were not so mindful
at the hearing of the petition, even though the issue
was far from settled. From the standpoint of custody,
the meaning of the petition was, in my respectful view,
quite unsatisfactory. Virtually no evidence was di-
rected to this issue. The parties primarily concerned
themselves with adducing evidence to show whether,
on the basis of the many material battles engaged in
by them, one or the other of them should be favoured
by the trial judge in his determination of the issue of
cruelty.
No one bothered to bring forward much information
in respect of the two individuals who of all the persons
likely to be affected by these proceedings least de-
served to be ignored - the children.
2 9
Child psychiatrist Dr. Richard Gardner studied the effects of cus-
tody litigation on parties and concludes from his research that parents
may not be capable of the objectivity required to represent the best in-
terests of their child during a custody dispute.30 Dr. Gardner writes:
People involved in custody litigation are fighting. They are
fighting for their most treasured possessions - their children.
The stakes are extremely high. Litigation over money, prop-
erty, and other matters associated with the divorce produce
strong feelings of resentment and anger. However, they are
less likely to result in reactions of rage and fury than are con-
flicts over the children. Children are the extensions of our-
selves, our hopes for the future, and thereby closely tied up
with our own identities. Fighting for them is almost like fight-
ing for ourselves. The two may become indistinguishable, and
the fight becomes a 'fight for life.'
3 '
29. Id. at 4-8.
30. RICHARD GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION - A GUIDE FOR PARENTS AND
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1986).
31. Id. at 19.
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Custody hearings are wrought with underlying hostility and con-
flicting opinions and attitudes regarding the child's best interests.
When considered logically, the only reason courts are involved is be-
cause of the parents' inability to agree on what is in the child's best
interest.
B. Alternatives
Many writers have criticized the best interest test in child custody
proceedings and have argued for a more defined and easily applied test.
Professor Martha A. Fineman argues that there are viable and perhaps
preferable alternatives to the best interest test. 32 Professor Fineman
recommends a test that is not dependent on the weighing of parental
attributes, but one that boldly prioritizes the most significant factors to
be considered by courts when determining child custody. In her article,
Professor Fineman discusses what she considers to be the amorphous,
undirected, incomprehensible and indeterminable subjective standard
that has evolved in custody matters as a result of the best interest test,
and argues in favour of courts alternatively applying a "primary-care-
taker" rule. 33 With respect to the "primary-caretaker" rule, Professor
Fineman states:
This rule has been characterized in different ways, but the es-
sence of the primary-caretaker standard is that children need
day-to-day care, and that the parent who has performed this
primary care during the marriage should get custody.... The
primary-caretaker rule implicitly recognizes that no expert can
confidently make the predictions required under the future-ori-
ented best-interest placement, and that past behaviour may in
fact be the best indication we have of commitment to the future
care and concern for children.
3 4
Professor Fineman's approach may be distinguished from the gen-
eral judicial application of the best interest test in that it may be a more
intellectually honest approach and more objective in its application as
between the parties, and not as dependent upon the norms and values of
a particular judge or the presentation by parents' counsel. In fact, when
the courts apply the best interests standard, are they not in fact address-
ing who is best able to provide the child with day-to-day care? There is
no doubt that a better test could assist the courts in awarding custody in
a more consistent and seemingly less arbitrary manner. A test where
32. Martha A. Fineman, The Politics of Custody and the Transformation of American Custody
Decision Making, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 829 (1989).
33. Id. at 835 n. 19 ("The best interest of the child test involves a comparative balanc-
ing of the strengths and weaknesses of the parents. Factors such as health, wealth, educa-
tion, and moral conduct have all been considered. The test is indeterminate and easily
manipulated by judges and lawyers. Appellate review is rare since it is very fact specific
and the trial judge has wide discretion to conclude which parent will act in the child's
interest."). See also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best interest of the Child, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987).
34. MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM 181 (1991).
[Vol. 69:3
1992] MANDA TORY INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION
prior to trial, the parties could know more precisely on what factors the
court will place emphasis could also result in more out of court settle-
ments of custody and access issues. Professor Fineman's approach,
however, has the inherent danger of ignoring the child.
Professor David L. Chambers also perceives difficulties in the appli-
cation of the best interest test.3 5 Professor Chambers writes:
The current approach states use for resolving custody disputes
in divorce - a case-by-case inquiry into the best interests of the
child - has many flaws. One has been that neither legislatures
nor custom has provided judges with a coherent framework for
thinking about what children's interests are. A second, equally
serious, has been the inability ofjudges to make accurate deter-
minations, under the circumstances prevailing in the context of
litigation, of the quality of most individual children's relation-
ships with their parents or of the parents' skill at childrear-
ing. . . . Because of the many ways in which court
determinations under the current rules are likely to be unrelia-
ble, if there is a sound basis for believing that any general rule
will produce better outcomes than a random assignment, such
a rule has a plausible foundation.
3 6
Professor Chambers concludes, however, by stating that despite nu-
merous criticisms of the best interest test, that it should remain the pri-
mary analytical tool used by courts in the determination of child custody
disputes.
3 7
III. MANDATORY INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION: A NECESSARY
SAFEGUARD
We are of the view that the best interest standard is still the best test
to be applied in contested child custody and access cases, and that a
child's best interests can be properly considered by a court if the child is
independently represented by a child advocate or comparable legal
counsel. We are of the view that independent representation is essential
to ensure that the trier of fact is provided with all the salient information
necessary to canvass and consider the issue of child custody. Independ-
ent counsel can also ensure that the child's rights are vigorously advo-
cated and defended. Authors Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, however,
express concerns about encouraging state involvement in the resolution
of "private" domestic disputes.3 8 The authors do, however, acknowl-
35. David L. Chambers, Rethinking The Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MIcH. L. REV. 477 (1984).
36. Id. at 558-59.
37. Id. at 559 ("Having completed the review, I now believe that no new or revived
presumptions based on gender or primary-caretaker status can meet this standard on the
basis of the existing empirical studies standing alone. There is simply not enough hard
evidence that children in general are better off with women, primary-caretakers, or the
parent of same sex than with the opposite parent. However, the state of evidence with
regard to the three factors is not identical, and one of them, primary-caretaker status, may
still warrant some sort of preference, when developmental theory and practical values that
a preference - serve are taken into account.").
38. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET At.., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
613
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edge the need for intervention by the state to protect the best interests
of the child in contested custody disputes:
In divorce and separation proceedings, the imposition of coun-
sel under this ground is justified only if the parents are unable
to decide custody on their own-that is, if they ask the court to
decide. By failing to agree on a disposition, separating parents
waive their claim to parental autonomy and thereby their right
to be the exclusive representatives of their child's interests.
The child then requires representation independent of his par-
ents' to assure that his interests are treated as paramount in
determining who shall have custody.
39
Independent representation is premised on a growing recognition
that children have interests and rights that need to be considered dis-
tinctly and separately from those of adults, particularly their parents.
Independent representation allows for the identification of the rights
and needs of the child. A policy whereby children would be universally
entitled to, and represented by their own counsel will ensure that the
child's needs are given the priority the best interest test assumes it does.
The authors of one study wrote:
[W]ithout separate representation for the child, the court may
neglect important interests of the child in both the outcome
and the process of the proceeding. Because the best interests
standard is a general principle or statement of values rather
than a precise test, it has been criticized for providing "no indi-
cation of the degree of attention paid to the child's needs" in
application, for reducing judicial opinions to "amorphous plati-
tudes or generalizations," and for leaving the custody decision
essentially indeterminate.
40
Former Chief Judge Andrews of the Ontario Provincial Court's
Family Division, and Pasquale Gelsomino write in their article:
Traditionally, the courts have been satisfied the children's in-
terests were adequately represented by the adult parties. In re-
cent years, however, children have been increasingly
recognized as individual persons, with views, preferences and
interests distinct from those of their parents, guardians and
child protection agencies.
4 1
It is submitted that the best interest test, as it is currently applied,
makes the court dependant upon the feuding parents' counsel to adduce
and present all the information necessary to make an informed decision
with regard to the custody of the child. Consequently, a court's decision
in any proceeding where a child in a contested custody hearing has not
been represented by independent counsel, should be suspect. Further-
more, a lawyer with a professional obligation to an adult client will not
39. Id. at 115.
40. Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Dis-
pites Arisingfrom Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1135 (1977-78) (citations omitted).
41. H. Andrews & Pasquale Gelsomino, Legal Representation of Children in Custody and
Pvtection Proceedings: 4 Comparative View, in FAMILY LAW: DIMENSIONS OF JUSTICE 141, 141
(Rosalie S. Abella & Claire L'Heureux-Dube eds., 1983)).
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present evidence that is relevant to the child's best interests where that
evidence is damaging to the adult's case. As well, if counsel is expected
to represent the parent's and child's best interest, ethical and profes-
sional dilemmas will arise by having to prioritize conflicting interests.
There is also a real danger that if parents are not cross-examined by the
independent counsel representing the child, that the intentions and in-
tegrity of each parent's testimony will not be adequately challenged, or
at the very least not adequately examined through the eyes of the child.
Where a child is not independently represented, the cumulative effect is
that the court may be making decisions without truly addressing the
child's best interest.
4 2
Some would also argue that court appointed mental health profes-
sionals are capable of presenting all the necessary information and evi-
dence pertaining to the child's best interests. It is our view that while
mental health professionals play a crucial role in assisting the court in
child custody disputes, they are not adequate replacements for a child
being represented by independent legal counsel. Legal counsel, unlike
mental health professionals, are able to participate in all aspects of the
proceeding, including negotiations between parents' counsel. A child's
independent counsel is also able to actively participate in the trial and
ensure that the focus of the trial remains in the best interests of the
child.
Appointing independent legal counsel to represent the child will
also "assure that one voice will be raised in sole representation of the
best interests of the minor child."'4 3 Professor Kerin S. Bischoff dis-
cusses the potential dangers of a system in which the appointment of
independent representation is not mandatory, particularly in custody
cases where child sexual abuse has been alleged.4 4 The advocate for the
child, rather than the trial judge or parents' counsel, is in the best posi-
tion to determine whether the child's circumstances have been fully liti-
gated.4 5 Bischoff concludes that absent this vigorous independent
representation, the record available for the trial judge will be "woefully
incomplete," 4 6 and that such representation should be mandatory in all
custody proceedings.
In 1974, the Law Reform Commission of Canada issued a report
challenging the long held belief that a child's interests in a custody mat-
ter would be adequately protected by the child's parents. 4 7 The Com-
42. Seesupra text accompanying note 40. "[T]hejudge is not well placed to reduce the
rancor of the proceedings, and is restricted to the courtroom and cannot on his own ob-
tain the facts pertaining particularly to the child's viewpoint." Id. at 1136.
43. Clark v. Clark, 358 N.W. 2d 438, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
44. Kerin S. Bischoff, The Voice of the Child: Independent Legal Representation of Children in
Private Custody Disputes When Sexual Abuse is Alleged, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1390 (1990).
45. Id. at 1390-91.
46. Id. at 1391.
47. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER No. I - THE FAMILY COURT
40-41 (1974) (where the right or interest of a child is directly or indirectly affected by the
court proceeding, it is not enough to rely on the judge, the parents, or the parents' coun-
sel to act as an advocate of the child). See also ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT
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mission's report provoked a number of Canadian provinces to legislate
certain recommendations embodied in the report and to begin consider-
ing the need for children to be independently represented, particularly
in acrimonious custody proceedings where the court could not confi-
dently conclude that the parties would present all the evidence relevant
to the best interests of the child. Ontario's 1984 Court of Justice Act,
for example, makes provision for minors to be represented by the Onta-
rio government's Official Guardian.
48
In the Saskatchewan case of McKercher v. McKercher,4 9 the Court of
Queen's Bench shied away from the normative attitude that the interests
of children always coincide with those of the parents, and that parents
always act in the best interests of their children. 50 The Saskatchewan
court's decision in McKercher reflected a growing recognition of the fact
that a child has interests, wishes and needs which conflict with those of
his or her parents. Despite resistance from the Official Guardian, whose
role had until then been limited to protecting the child's property inter-
ests, the court ordered that the child be represented by independent
counsel.
5'
Legislation governing custody and access in most Canadian prov-
inces now provides for appointment of independent counsel for children
at the court's discretion. The Canadian Law Reform Commission's rec-
ommendation that a child be represented in all custody proceedings,
however, has yet to be adopted in full by any Canadian court or legisla-
ture. The prevailing attitude apparently remains to be that a child's in-
terests and needs will be protected by his or her parents unless the court
determines otherwise.
Some countries and jurisdictions take a more active role in seeing
that the child's interests are independently represented. The Australian
Family Law Act governs the appointment of independent legal counsel
for children in custody disputes and makes specific provisions for a
child's separate representation. 5 2 However, similarly to the statutes in
most North American jurisdictions, the Australian act lays down no
guidelines indicating when the court should appoint independent coun-
sel to represent the child, nor does it absolutely require appointment.
Section 65 of the Australian act provides:
Where, in proceedings with respect to the custody, guardian-
ship or maintenance of, or access to, a child of a marriage, it
appears to the court that the child ought to be separately repre-
sented, the court may, of its own motion, or on the application
ON FAMILY LAW, PART III - CILDREN 124 (1973) (discussing the child's right to be inde-
pendently represented by counsel).
48. Court ofJustice Act, S.O., ch. 11, § 102 (1984) (Can.).
49. 2 W.W.R. 268 (Sask. QB. 1974).
50. Id. at 270.
51. Id. A case comment on McKercher notes it is reasonable to assume that independ-
ent counsel is the most viable method of representing the child, given that other tech-
niques have proven their own inadequacies and no viable alternative has yet presented
itself. Ron W. Hewitt, Case Comments, 42 SASK. L. REV. 295, 297 (1977-78).
52. Family Law Act, No. 53, § 65 (1975) (Austl.).
[Vol. 69:3
1992] MANDA TORY INDEPENDENT REPRESENTA TION 617
of the child or of an organization concerned with the welfare of
children or of any other person, order that the child be sepa-
rately represented, and the court may make such other orders
as it thinks necessary for the purpose of securing such separate
representation.
5 3
In the United States, while the majority of states have enabling leg-
islation authorizing courts to appoint independent representation, only
Wisconsin 54 and New Hampshire 5 5 currently mandate independent rep-
resentation of children in custody proceedings. Legal scholars widely
applaud the Wisconsin approach, stating:
Wisconsin moved to the forefront of developing child custody
law by recognizing the complex aspects of custody disputes.
Wisconsin realized that courts may be incapable of protecting
and advancing the child's best interests because a court must
"evaluate evidence which is offered by the parents within a
highly volatile and emotional atmosphere."
'56
The evolution of Wisconsin's child custody law can be traced to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's Wendland v. Wendland 5 7 decision. In Wend-
land, the court discussed why independent legal representation for chil-
dren, in certain circumstances, was crucial to ensure that the court's
decision reflected what was in the best interests of the child. Justice Wil-
kie stated:
The appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the inter-
ests of children who are the subject of a custody fight in a di-
vorce proceeding is a step that the trial court should take only
in an extraordinary situation where the trial court believes that
what may be in the best interests of the children may not be
brought out by the two contesting parties. . . .Where there
have been instances of immoral misconduct on the part of one
(or both) parties and where the court is concerned over the ef-
fect of such misconduct on minor children, the court, in its ca-
pacity as a family court, recognizing that "children involved in a
divorce are always disadvantaged parties," may well take addi-
tional affirmative steps to protect the welfare of the chil-
dren. . . .Where there is a hotly contested dispute, and the
court is satisfied that the procedure of relying on the two par-
ties and the investigation of a welfare agency may not produce
all the important evidence that the court should consider in
looking after the best interests of the children, a guardian ad
litem should be appointed. Inevitably this will add to the ex-
pense of the divorce proceedings. But such expense will be re-
53. Id.
54. WIs. STAT. § 767.045 (1991).
55. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-a (1989).
56. Brenda M. Flock, Custody Disputes Arising From Divorce: The Child's Need For Counsel In
Pennsyvania, 87 DIcK. L. REV. 351, 354 (1983); see also Tari Eitzen, .4 Childs Right To In-
dependent Legal Representation in a Custody Dispute: A Unique Legal Situation, .4 Necessarily Broad
Standard, The Child's Constitutional Rights, The Role of the Attorney whose Client is the Child, 19
FAM. L.Q. I, 53 (1985).
57. 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
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warding if the interests of the children are better served. 58
While the court in Wendland clearly stated that the discretion to ap-
point independent legal counsel should be exercised in only limited cir-
cumstances, the same court held ten years later that children are
"indispensable parties to the proceedings," and stressed the need for
children to be independently represented in any custody proceeding. 59
It is submitted that Wisconsin's legislation is an excellent basis upon
which to model similar legislation in Canada, and for this reason the
germane sections of the Wisconsin statute are worthy of note:
(1) APPOINTMENT (a) The Court shall appoint a guardian
ad litem for a minor child in any action affecting the family if
any of the following conditions exists:
1. The court has reason for special concern as to the wel-
fare of a minor child.
2. The legal custody or physical placement of the child is
contested.
(4) RESPONSIBILITIES. The guardian ad litem shall be an
advocate for the best interests of a minor child as to legal cus-
tody, physical placement and support. The guardian ad litem
shall function independently, in the same manner as an attor-
ney for a party to the action, and shall consider, but shall not be
bound by, the wishes of the minor child or the positions of
others as to the best interest of the minor child. The guardian
ad litem shall consider the factors under s. 767.24(5) and cus-
tody studies under s. 767.11(14). The guardian ad litem shall
review and comment to the court on any mediation agreements
and stipulation made under s. 767.11(12). Unless the child
otherwise requests, the guardian ad litem shall communicate to
the court the wishes of the child as to the child's legal custody
or physical placement under s. 767.24(5)(b). The guardian ad
litem has none of the rights or duties of a general guardian.
(6) FEES. The guardian ad litem shall be compensated at a rate
that the court shall determine is reasonable. The court shall or-
der either or both parties to pay all or any part of the fee of the
guardian ad litem. In addition, upon motion by the guardian ad
litem, the court shall order either or both parties to pay the fee
for an expert witness used by the guardian ad litem, if the
guardian ad litem shows that the use of the expert is necessary
to assist the guardian ad litem in performing his or her func-
tions or duties under this chapter. If either or both parties are
unable to pay, the court may direct that the county of venue pay
the fees, in whole or in part, and may direct that any or all par-
ties reimburse the county, in whole or in part, for the payment.
58. Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
59. Montigny v. Montigny, 233 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Wisc. 1975). One author argues
that even in the absence of statutes mandating consideration of the child's wishes, judges
who fail to elicit or who totally ignore children's custodial preferences are increasingly
likely to have their custody orders reversed on appeal. Howard A. Davidson, The Child's
Right to be Heard and Represented in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 270 (1991).
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The court may order a separate judgment for the amount of the
reimbursement in favour of the county and against the party or
parties responsible for the reimbursement. The court may en-
force its orders under this subsection by means of its contempt
power.
60
Wisconsin's legislation clearly articulates the need for children to
be independently represented in contested custody matters and ensures
that the focus of any proceeding remains where the enabling legislation
meant it to be - on the best interests of the child.
IV. ROLE OF COUNSEL FOR THE CHILD
Although the role of counsel for the child is to express the child's
point of view, in court, counsel for the child plays a unique role in con-
tested custody dispute resolutions. Dan L. Goldberg, counsel for the
Office of the Official Guardian in Ontario, Canada wrote:
Unless an assessment has been conducted it is likely that coun-
sel (and possibly his/her social worker) are the only person(s)
to have met all the key people. If we have done a thorough job
of preparation and appropriately express our knowledge the
Official Guardian counsel should be cloaked with a high degree
of credibility with the parties and their lawyers when we hold a
settlement meeting.
Given our previous interviews we will, hopefully be able to
know the difficult issues and those that are capable of easier
resolution. By continually emphasizing the benefits to their
child of an amicable resolution to the dispute as well as the
high cost of litigation the parties' focus often begins to move
from antagonism with each other to a greater willingness to
compromise. 6 1
Because child custody trials have the potential for having a debilitat-
ing effect on all the parties involved, it is of the utmost importance that
negotiation and settlement are encouraged. Dr. Richard Gardner adds
that litigation should be avoided due to its devastating impact on the
respective parents and children involved. 6 2 Dr. Gardner writes:
The adversary system, which professes to help parents resolve
their differences, is likely to intensify the hostilities that it
claims it is designed to reduce. It provides the litigants with
ammunition that they may not have realized they possessed. It
contributes to an ever-increasing vicious cycle of vengeance -
so much so that the litigation may bring about more psycholog-
ical damage than the pains and grief of the marriage that origi-
nally brought about the divorce.6 3
Independent legal counsel for the child in custody disputes is in a
better position to foster out of court settlements because he or she is in
60. WIs. STAT. § 767.045 (1991).
61. Dan L. Goldberg, Representing Children in Custodv and Access hoceedings in Onario,
CAN. B. Ass'N INST. C.L.E. 37 (1989).
62. GARDNER, supra note 30.
63. Id. at 19.
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a unique position that enables them to shift the focus of the dispute
from the feuding parents to the needs of the child. Counsel for the child
is also in a better position to assess the chances of success at trial. At a
preliminary stage, independent counsel can also assist in forcing parents
to seriously consider alternatives to a prolonged and difficult trial, bear-
ing in mind the needs of the child.
In Leatherdale v. Leatherdale,64 the Supreme Court of Canada dis-
cussed the need, and even responsibility of legislatures, courts and the
bar to develop more easily applied and understandable tests in family
law matters. Mr. Justice Estey wrote:
Family law, more than any other branch of the law, must pro-
vide, where it is possible, simple and clear rules which readily
lend themselves to expeditious application in the trial courts.
Litigation over family matters is never economic, always a
heavy expense and a painful experience. The simpler the rules,
the easier their application by the courts; and even more impor-
tantly, the more readily applied by the legal advisors to the
members of the family who must always strive to settle differ-
ences without recourse to the delays, expense and pain of court
proceedings .65
Independent counsel for the child may not necessarily simplify the
case, but the role of counsel for the child should be to attempt to settle
differences from the child's point of view, without litigation if possible.
As well, if parents are confronted with the additional burden of paying
the legal fees of counsel representing their child, as they would be under
the Wisconsin legislation for example, parents will be more likely to
evaluate their chances of success before the beginning of a long trial in
order to minimize the risk of having to pay additional fees to legal coun-
sel who represented their child.
V. CONCLUSION
We support the best interest test because it is simple and clear. Ap-
plication of the standard, however, begs the question, in whose best in-
terest? We must ensure that the child remains central to the test.
Professor Foster's summary targets the denial of due process and the
failure to regard children as persons with rights, as the result of not
providing a child independent legal counsel. Professor Foster writes:
Children do have a right to childhood but it must be recog-
nized that childhood is preliminary to adolescence and eventual
adulthood and moreover, it is the most crucial period in human
development. It is also obvious that much depends upon one's
definition of "childhood".... But there are certain fundamen-
tals that are constant, such as the interest in having independ-
ent counsel whenever the placement of a child is at stake, and
the right to fair treatment from all those who are in authority. 66
64. 2 S.C.R. 743 (1982).
65. Id. at 772-73.
66. Supra note 13, at 3-7.
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Children should therefore have independent counsel whenever
their interest is in issue. This recommendation ensures that the best
interest of the child is met and is made within the context of the legal
and adversarial system, which we believe is here to stay. Given this ad-
versarial system, independent representation is essential if the child's
voice is to be heard. Although most legislation affords the child access
to independent counsel, statutes do not go far enough to mandate rep-
resentation. In the administration of justice, if the best interest of the
child is to be served, then the child must be heard and must have legal
status where placement or welfare is in issue. Counsel for the child
should be afforded full status throughout the matter as if the child were
a party to the proceeding. 6 7 The Law Reform Commission made its rec-
ommendation for independent representation for the child in 1974.68
Professor Foster made his plea some eighteen years ago.6 9 The legal
community has come a small distance, but a great distance remains to
ensure that the legal system serves the best interests of the child.
67. Reid v. Reid, 11 O.R.2d 622, 630 (Orit. H.C.J. 1975).
68. See supra text accompanying note 47.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 13 & 68.

